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Mt. Healthy and Causation-in-Fact:
The Court Still Doesn't Get It!
by Sheldon Nahmod"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over fifteen years ago, I argued in a prior edition of my section 1983
treatise that the second burden-shift part of the Mt. Healthy' test,
articulated by the Supreme Court in 1977, should go only to damages
and not to liability.2 I also argued that this causation-in-fact rule
should not be limited to Mt. Healthy-type First Amendment employment
cases, but should apply to constitutional damages actions generally and
equal protection cases in particular.3 I remain convinced that both
aspects of this position are normatively sound, even if no longer good
law, in light of the Court's end-of-the-millennium decision in Texas v.
Lesage.' My position is supported by the following: (1) the Court's 1978
procedural due process decision in Carey v. Piphus;5 (2) the Court's 1995
after-acquired evidence decision in McKennon v. Nashville Banner

* Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. University of Chicago (B.A., 1962); Harvard Law School (J.D., 1965; LL.M.
1971; University of Chicago Divinity School (Master in Religious Studies, 1996). Thanks
to Hal Lewis for asking me to participate in a panel presentation at the annual meeting
of the Employment Discrimination Section of the Association of American Law Schools,
which was held on January 8, 2000, in Washington, D.C. Thanks, as well, to my colleagues
at Chicago-Kent who helped me think through some of my ideas at a faculty roundtable.
As always, I appreciate the research support of the Marshall Ewell Fund.
1. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
2.

SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF

SECTION 1983 § 4.02 (2d ed. 1986) (currently in its fourth edition).
3. Id.
4. 120 S. Ct. 467 (1999) (per curiam).
5. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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PublishingCo.;6 (3) causation-in-fact principles from tort law; and (4)
the compensation and deterrence policies underlying section 1983.'

II.

MT. HEALTHY AND FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS

Mt. Healthy dealt with a section 1983 action for reinstatement and
back pay arising out of a school board's refusal to renew an untenured
school teacher's contract. Plaintiff claimed that his contract was not
renewed because of protected First Amendment activity, while the school
board asserted that it was not renewed because of plaintiff's obvious lack
of professionalism. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling
that plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement and back pay because his
contract was not renewed as a result of protected First Amendment
activity. Significantly, the district court also found that there was
independent reason, apart from plaintiff's First Amendment activity, not
to renew his contract.'
Vacating and remanding the district court's order of reinstatement and
back pay, the Supreme Court set out the following test to be applied on
remand:
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon
respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and
that this conduct was a "substantial factor"-or, to put it in other
words, that it was a "motivating factor" in the Board's decision not to
rehire him. Respondent having carried that burden, however, the
District Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board
had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision as to respondent's re-employment even in
the absence of the protected conduct. 9

6.

513 U.S. 352 (1995).

7. This statute reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1997).
8. 429 U.S. at 281-85.
9. Id. at 287 (footnote omitted).
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The Court reasoned that "[a] rule of causation which focuses solely on
whether protected conduct played a part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in
a decision not to rehire, could place an employee in a better position as
a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he
would have occupied had he done nothing."' ° It concluded, "The
constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an
employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in
the conduct.""
Thus, in cases in which there may be mixed motives for an employment decision, one motive allegedly violative of the First Amendment
and the other motive permissible, there are two burdens under Mt.
Healthy. The first is the plaintiff's: Did the plaintiff prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the impermissible motive was a
substantial factor in the challenged decision? If the answer is no, then
the plaintiff has lost on the First Amendment violation issue and there
is obviously no need to address the remedy issue. If the answer is yes,
then the burden-shift inquiry kicks in: Did the defendant prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision anyway (i.e., did the defendant prove the absence of but-for
causation)? If the answer to the burden-shift inquiry is no, then the
plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement and back pay and any other
damages attributable to the job loss because the First Amendment
violation caused the job loss.
However, if the answer to the burden-shift inquiry is yes, then the
plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement and back pay because the First
Amendment violation did not cause the job loss. Nevertheless, and here
is the major point, I argue that there is a First Amendment violation in
this situation and that the plaintiff should be entitled to whatever
compensatory damages that he can prove are attributable to the First
Amendment violation itself, excluding any damages attributable to the
job loss. 2 For example, there may be emotional distress resulting from
the chilling effect upon the plaintiff for being punished for past First

10. Id. at 285.
11. Id. at 285-86.
12. I emphasize that such damages are neither presumed damages, Carey, 435 U.S. at
259-64, nor damages for the "intrinsic value" of First Amendment rights, Memphis
Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308-10 (1986), neither of which is
permitted under section 1983. However, I have argued elsewhere that presumed damages
should be recoverable for First Amendment violations. See 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 4:4 (4th ed. 1997)
[hereinafter NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION].
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Amendment activity and from the frustration of the denial of the
plaintiff's right of self-expression. 3
Admittedly, this may be very difficult for a plaintiff to prove in the
typical First Amendment employment case. But even when the plaintiff
cannot prove any compensable emotional distress, the plaintiff should be
entitled at least to nominal damages to vindicate the constitutional
interest harmed. Perhaps the plaintiff should also be entitled to
attorney fees as a prevailing party 4 when the defendant is a local
government 5 or an individual not protected by absolute or qualified
immunity."5 Indeed, without the possibility of recovering damages for
First Amendment harm caused (again, apart from the job loss), the
plaintiff is actually placed in a "worse ...position than if he had not
engaged in the conduct" because he is denied compensation for harm
caused. 7 The Court's emphasis in Mt. Healthy that the mixed-motive
13. Damages for emotional distress (general damages) are recoverable under section
1983, even when there are no lost wages or other special damages. Cf. Carey, 435 U.S. at
263-64 (rejecting an argument for presumed damages for procedural due process violations
and explaining, "[We foresee no particular difficulty in producing evidence that mental

and emotional distress actually was caused by the denial of procedural due process itself.
Distress is a personal injury familiar to the law, customarily proved by showing the nature
and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff."). For a full discussion of
Carey, see infra Part IV.
14. "Inany action or proceeding to enforce (section 1983 and other civil rights statutes]
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. III 1997). However, when a plaintiff
recovers only nominal damages after unsuccessfully seeking substantially more, the Court
has ruled that any award of attorney fees must take into account this almost total lack of
success and may even be eliminated altogether. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114-15
(1992).
15. Local governments can be held liable for compensatory damages under section 1983
for constitutional violations brought about through their official policies or customs. See
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). This is a very
complicated and often arcane subject. See 1 NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION, supra note 12, § 6:1 to :71.

16. Primarily for instrumental reasons, certain individuals-typically legislators,
judges, and prosecutors-who are sued under section 1983 for their constitutional
violations are often protected from damages liability by absolute immunity when they have
acted legislatively, judicially, or in an advocative capacity. See 2 NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 12, § 7:1 to :65.

Also primarily for instrumental reasons, government officials who are sued under section
1983 for their constitutional violations, but who are not protected by absolute immunity
may be protected by qualified immunity if they prove that a reasonable official could have
believed in the constitutional validity of the challenged conduct at the time it occurred in
light of pre-existing law. The qualified immunity standard is thus one of objective
reasonableness. See 2 NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note

12, § 8:1 to :99.
17. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286.
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plaintiff is entitled to no more than the restoration of the status quo
ante suggests that the plaintiff should be entitled to no less than that.
Admittedly, the Court in Mt. Healthy focused on reinstatement and
back pay. Thus, strictly speaking, Mt. Healthy did not address
causation-in-fact in a damages setting. Still, my prior understanding of
Mt. Healthy and the effect of the burden-shift rule was not necessarily
inconsistent with the Court's language in the case. The above-quoted
language mentions "[tihe constitutional principle at stake," thus
suggesting that there was indeed a constitutional violation in Mt.
Healthy.i" Also, in Mt. Healthy the remedy at issue was not damages
but rather the equitable remedy of reinstatement and back pay, each
aspect of which is connected to the loss of employment itself. That is,
the Court did not necessarily hold that a person in the Mt. Healthy
plaintiff's situation is precluded from recovering damages not attributable to loss of employment. Instead, its focus was on the loss of
employment and fairness to the employer.
On the other hand, other parts of the opinion can be read very
differently. For example, several sentences before the Court's reference
to "[t]he constitutional principle at stake," the Court described the issue
before it as whether, when an employer would have reached the same
decision even apart from the impermissible motive, "the fact that the
protected conduct played a 'substantial part' in the actual decision not
to renew would necessarily amount to a constitutional violation
justifying remedial action."9 This can be understood as indicating that
a defendant who carries Mt. Healthy's shifted burden has prevailed on
the merits of the constitutional violation itself.
All this demonstrates that exegesis is better reserved for sacred texts
than for Supreme Court decisions.2" For present purposes it suffices
that reading the burden-shift rule of Mt. Healthy as going to remedy and
not to liability was at least plausible and not necessarily inconsistent
with the position that this burden shift should go to remedy. On the
other hand, after Mt. Healthy most of the circuit courts addressing the
issue understood Mt. Healthy's burden-shift rule as going to liability and
not to remedy.2 ' Moreover, a majority of the justices, including Justice

18. Id. at 285.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Mt. Heathy's ambiguity on the burden shift may well have been intentional so as
to allow it to be interpreted subsequently as going to liability. Indeed, this turned out to
be the case. See Lesage, 120 S. Ct. at 468. For further discussion of Lesage, see infra Parts
III, VIII.
21. See 1 NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 12,
§ 4:10, at 4-34 n.13.
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Brennan, appeared to read Mt. Healthy the same way in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.22 Finally, in November 1999 the Court in Lesage,
which was a unanimous per curiam decision without benefit of briefs
and argument, declared that Mt. Healthy's burden-shift rule goes to
liability in all section 1983 damages actions based on First Amendment
and Equal Protection Clause violations.23

III.

TEXAS V. LESAGE: A FIRST LOOK

Lesage involved section 1981, section 1983, and Title VI claims for
damages and injunctive relief brought by a white African immigrant
against the University of Texas and others for allegedly rejecting, on
racial grounds, his application for admission to the school's Ph.D.
program in counseling psychology. He argued that the school's race-

22. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In this case, a plurality of the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, interpreted the "because of" language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as follows:
[Olnce a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a motivating part
in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by
proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed
gender to play such a role. This balance of burdens is the direct result of Title
VII's balance of rights.
Id. at 244-45 (footnote omitted). In addition, Justice Brennan ruled that the defendant
could carry its burden by a preponderance of the evidence; clear and convincing evidence
was not required. Id. at 252-53. Justice White concurred in the judgment, disagreeing
with the part of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion that suggested that the defendant had
to carry its burden by objective evidence. Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice O'Connor also concurred in the judgment and emphasized that the
burden-shift rule went to liability. Id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Arguing that the plaintiff in a Title VII case has the burden of proving that the
impermissible motive was a but-for cause of the challenged employment decision, Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, dissented. Id. at 281
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse referred several times to Mt.
Healthy in the course of arguing that the burden-shift rule was not an unfamiliar one in
mixed-motive employment cases. This might suggest that Mt. Healthy's burden-shift rule
goes to liability just as Price Waterhouse's burden-shift rule does. However, unlike Justice
White, Justice Brennan did not explicitly declare that the burden shift in Mt. Healthy goes
to liability. Moreover, the plurality's emphasis on Title VII's language can serve to
distinguish Price Waterhouse from Mt. Healthy because the latter case was a constitutional
damages action. Finally, it may well be that Justice Brennan was constrained to hold that
the burden-shift rule in Price Waterhouse goes to liability because that was the price of
getting a fifth Justice to go along with the holding that the plaintiffs burden in a Title VII
case is to prove that gender was a motive-that is, a substantial factor-in the adverse
employment action and that the plaintiff does not have to prove but-for causation, despite
the position of the dissent.
23. 120 S. Ct. at 468.
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conscious admissions program violated his federal constitutional and
statutory rights. Granting defendants' motion for summary judgment
on all claims, the district court concluded that consideration of race did
not affect plaintiff's rejection.24 The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that
even if the school would have rejected plaintiff under a colorblind
admissions process, that was "irrelevant to the pertinent issue on
summary judgment, namely, whether the state violated Lesage's
constitutional rights by rejecting his application in the course of
operating a racially discriminatory admissions program."25 It went on
to observe that if plaintiff was rejected at any racially conscious stage of
the admissions process, then he had "suffered an implied injury"-the
inability to compete on equal footing with other applicants.26 Because
there was a factual dispute as to this, summary judgment for defendants
was inappropriate.2
The Supreme Court in turn unanimously reversed in a per curiam
opinion." As to the section 1983 damages claim, the Court expressly
ruled that, under the approach of Mt. Healthy, even if defendants
actually considered the impermissible criterion of race in rejecting
plaintiff, they would "defeat liability" if they could prove that plaintiff
would still have been rejected under a race-neutral policy.2 9 It acknowledged that Mt. Healthy, unlike Lesage, involved protected First
Amendment activity, "but that distinction is immaterial. The underlying
principle is the same. . . ."0 The Court concluded, "Simply put, where
a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on
an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government
would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable
injury warranting relief under § 1983."3'
Interestingly, the Court distinguished between plaintiff's section 1983
claim for damages, which it described as backward-looking, and his
section 1983 claim for injunctive relief, which it described as forwardlooking.32 As to the latter, "a plaintiff who challenges an ongoing raceconscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race were not
considered. The relevant injury in such cases is 'the inability to compete

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 467-68.
Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 222 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id.
120 S. Ct. at 469.
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 469.
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on an equal footing.'" 33 According to the Court, however, in Lesage it
was not clear whether plaintiff had abandoned the claim that the school
was currently operating a race-conscious admissions process.34 Hence,
this issue, together with the section 1981 and Title VI statutory claims,
would need to be addressed on remand.35
As noted, the Court decided Lesage without briefs or oral argument,
thereby clearly indicating that the Court considered the Mt. Healthy
burden-shift issue to be well settled for both First Amendment and
Equal Protection Clause damages claims brought under section 1983.
And so it now is after Lesage. But why was there no injury because of
"'the inability to compete on an equal footing"' in connection with the
Lesage plaintiff's backward-looking section 1983 damages action?"
After all, the opportunity to compete for admission to the Ph.D. program
is different from being denied admission. Hence, the damages that may
be attributable to the injury to the ability to compete on an equal footing
on the one hand, and to the injury resulting from denial of admission on
the other, are different as well. In addition, injury to the ability to
compete on an equal footing, when accompanied by a racial stigma as it
may have been in Lesage, may give rise to emotional distress damages
separate from those damages attributable to denial of admission. This
is also generally true for section 1983 racial discrimination and other
equal protection cases in which the defendant carries the Mt. Healthy
burden shift. The injury is to the interest in not having race used as a
factor in employment decisions, even
if it turns out that the decision
37
would have been the same anyway.
Lesage will be revisited at the end of this Article. For now I want to
turn to the arguments that support the position that Mt. Healthy's
burden-shift rule should go to remedy and not to liability.

33. Id. at 468 (quoting Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors
v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)).
34. Id. at 469.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 468 (quoting NortheasternFla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors,
508 U.S. at 666).
37. The injury to this interest, which is, at least in part, expressive in nature, is
analogous to the injury alleged in racial districting cases in which a majority-minority
district is created predominantly for the purpose of enhancing the voting power of blacks
as a group. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-48 (1993) (asserting that, even though
no individual voter's right was denied or diluted, such districting causes injury to voters
by both reinforcing racial stereotypes and undermining representative government by
signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their
constituency as a whole).

20001
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CAREY V. PIPHUS AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS

Before Lesage the argument that Mt. Healthy's burden-shift should go
to remedy and not to liability derived considerable support from Carey,
which the Court decided one year after Mt. Healthy. In that section
1983 damages case, which involved student suspensions from school
without an adjudicatory hearing, the Court was concerned primarily
with the damages recoverable for procedural due process violations and
whether such damages could be presumed. Ultimately, the Court ruled
that presumed damages are not recoverable for procedural due process
violations and that plaintiffs had to prove actual damages, which could
include general damages for mental and emotional distress.3 ' However,
more important for present purposes, the Court addressed the question
of the damages that the students could recover if it subsequently turned
out that their suspensions were justified.3 9 It stated:
Even if respondents' suspensions were justified, and even if they did
not suffer any other actual injury, the fact remains that they were
deprived of their right to procedural due process. "It is enough to
invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that
a significant property interest is at stake, whatever the ultimate
outcome of a hearing...."
Because the right to procedural due process is "absolute" in the sense
that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant's substantive
assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that
procedural due process be observed, we believe that the denial of
procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages
without proof of actual injury. We therefore hold that if, upon remand,
the District Court determines that respondents' suspensions were
justified, respondents nevertheless will be entitled to recover nominal
damages not to exceed one dollar from petitioners.'
What the Court said about procedural due process violations should
apply with at least as much force to First Amendment violations in the
employment setting. There is certainly no gainsaying the importance of
the First Amendment in our constitutional system. Indeed, self-

38. 435 U.S. at 264.
39. Id. at 266.
40. Id. at 266-67 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972)) (citations and
footnotes omitted). The Court's only reference to Mt. Healthy was in connection with its
observation that if the suspensions were justified, then "an award of damages for injuries
caused by the suspensions would constitute a windfall, rather than compensation, to [the
students]." Id. at 260.
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government is considered by many to be a-perhaps the-major function
of the First Amendment.41 In addition, once an adverse governmental
employment decision is tainted by an impermissible First Amendment
motivation, this should constitute a First Amendment violation that
caused harm, even apart from the job loss, possibly consisting of
emotional distress stemming from the insult to the plaintiff. Such harm
can be present even when the defendant carries Mt. Healthy's burdenshift because in both procedural due process and First Amendment
violation cases, the construction of a but-for hypothetical to determine
causation is just that-hypothetical and counterfactual. In real-world
causal terms, these are not abstract constitutional violations "in the air."
The challenged decision in Carey, the procedural due process case, was
in fact made in the absence of a hearing, and the employment decision
in Mt. Healthy, the First Amendment case, was similarly made, in part
because of an impermissible First Amendment motivation. In short,
constitutional violations and resulting harm have occurred in both
situations, justifying at least an award of nominal damages and the
chance to prove general damages.42
V.

MCKENNON V. NASHVILLE BANNER PUBLISHING Co. AND AFTER-

ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
The argument that Mt. Healthy's burden-shift should go to remedy and
not to liability is also supported in principle by the Court's 1995 decision
in McKennon regarding after-acquired evidence. In that case, the Court
unanimously held that an employee discharged in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") is not "barred from all
relief when, after her discharge, the employer discovers evidence of
wrongdoing that, in any event, would have led to the employee's
termination on lawful and legitimate grounds."43 It emphasized that
"[tihe employee's wrongdoing must be taken into account ... lest the
employer's legitimate concerns be ignored.""' It also observed that as
a general matter in such cases, when the employer proves that the
employee would have been discharged on those grounds alone had they

41.

See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-

GOVERNMENT (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961
SuP. CT. REV. 245.

42. The argument here regarding the First Amendment should apply equally to racially
discriminatory employment actions violative of the Equal Protection Clause. See supra

Part III.
43. 513 U.S. at 354.
44. Id. at 361.
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been discovered, neither reinstatement nor front pay is appropriate.45
According to the Court, however, back pay can be awarded, but is
limited to "the calculation of backpay from the date of the unlawful
discharge to the date the new information was discovered." 46 The
Court commented that this approach promotes the purposes of the ADEA
while at the same time not requiring employers to ignore employee
wrongdoing.47
Although McKennon did not involve two simultaneous mixed motives
as did Mt. Healthy and Lesage, McKennon is still instructive because it
did, after all, deal with two motives-one impermissible, the other
not--either of which independently could have caused the employee's
discharge and both of which were the employer's. 48 Given the temporal
sequence in McKennon, with the impermissible motive coming first, the
Court could not have realistically found that the impermissible motive
was not a substantial factor-indeed, it was the sole factor-in causing
the employee's discharge. Instead, it had to focus on the scope of the
remedy, limit damages (the back pay award), and preclude reinstatement and front pay. In so doing, the Court correctly balanced fairness
to the employer and the purposes of the ADEA, which would have been
undermined if the Court had promulgated a no-damages liability rule.
Precisely the same should hold true in a mixed-motive case in which
the employer carries the Mt. Healthy burden-shift. Reinstatement, back
pay, and other damages for the job loss are inappropriate because of
fairness concerns for the employer. However, a refusal to allow the
employee to prove actual damages (apart from the job loss) attributable
to the First Amendment violation undermines the purposes of the First
Amendment in the employment setting.

VI.

THE BACKGROUND OF TORT LIABILITY

It is by now commonplace to observe that section 1983 is to be
interpreted against a background of tort liability. This phrase was first
used in the section 1983 context in the seminal 1961 decision of Monroe
v. Pape49 as support for the Court's holding that specific intent is not

45. Id. at 361-62.
46. Id. at 362.
47. Id.
48. That is, had the employer known of the evidence of wrongdoing earlier, it would
have discharged the employee at that time. Note that this is as much a hypothetical
construction as the one required by the second part of Mt. Healthy, which requires the
factfinder to suppose, counterfactually, that the employer had only one motive, a
permissible one.
49. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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required to prove the prima facie elements of a section 1983 cause of
action.5 ° Since that time the Court has also regularly insisted that
section 1983 immunity doctrines be developed against this common-law
tort background."' I have long argued that tort principles should not
determine the scope of section 1983 liability, but should be adopted only
when they promote the compensation and deterrence functions of section
1983.52 Consistent with that position, I contend that established
common-law tort principles of joint causation are the appropriate
causation principles for use in section 1983 mixed-motive cases like Mt.
Healthy and Lesage. Furthermore, under these principles a defendant
who carries the Mt. Healthy burden shift should prevail only with
respect to the scope of the remedy, not on liability.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts declares that an "actor's negligent
conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule
of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which
his negligence has resulted in the harm."5 3 It is part (a) that is directly
relevant to causation-in-fact, which section 432 of the Restatement goes
on to explicate.5 4 The general rule is that an actor's conduct is not a
substantial factor in causing another harm "if the harm would have been
sustained even if the actor had not been negligent."55 However, there
is a crucial exception in the following situation: "If two forces are
actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence, the other not
because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to
bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found to be
a substantial factor in bringing it about."" Furthermore, the comment
to section 432(2) explains that the rule applies "not only when the

50. Id. at 187. This approach actually predated Monroe by a decade. See Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,376-78 (1951) (relying on the common-law background of absolute
legislative immunity as support for holding that state legislators are absolutely immune
from damages liability under section 1983 for their core legislative conduct).
51. See 2 NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, supra note 12, §§ 7:1

to 8:99 (collecting and analyzing every Supreme Court decision regarding absolute and
qualified immunity under section 1983).
52. See Sheldon Nahmod, ConstitutionalDamages and CorrectiveJustice: A Different
View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997 (1990); Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from
Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719 (1989); Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional

Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IOwA L. REV. 1 (1982); Sheldon H. Nahmod,
Section 1983 and the "Background"of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5 (1974).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
54. In contrast, section 431(b) is relevant to the proximate cause inquiry, the rules of
which are set out in sections 435-461.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1).
56. Id. § 432(2).
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second force which is operating simultaneously with the force set in
motion by the defendant's negligence is generated by the negligent
conduct of a third person, but also when it is generated by an innocent
act of a third person or when its origin is unknown."57
The major reason for the section 432(2) exception is that there is a
serious flaw in the conventional but-for test for causation. If the but-for
test is applied to each of two independent forces, then the result is that
neither of the forces was a cause of the harm; yet, because the harm did
in fact occur, this result makes no sense. This flaw typically appears in
joint causation cases and explains why the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, following the lead of many courts, abandons the but-for cause-infact test in such situations and replaces it with the substantial factor
test.
The Mt. Healthy mixed motive kind of case is just such a joint
causation case. One force is the impermissible motivation, and the other
force is the permissible motivation, both of which contributed causally
to the resulting harm. If the defendant does not surmount the Mt.
Healthy burden-shift, then the defendant is liable for all damages,
including those resulting from the job loss. However, if the defendant
does carry this burden, then he has demonstrated that he is not
responsible for the job loss caused by the impermissible motive.
Nevertheless, he should still be responsible for any emotional distress
caused by the impermissible motive because that motive was a
substantial factor in bringing about that distress. If the plaintiff cannot
prove any emotional distress, then the plaintiff should at least be
entitled to nominal damages, as is the case for procedural due process
violations after Carey.
The contrary position-that the Mt. Healthy burden-shift goes to
liability and not to damages-inappropriately conflates causation-in-fact
and policy considerations related to liability.58 Because there are
damages resulting from the impermissible motive, and hence, from the
constitutional violation, even when a defendant carries the Mt. Healthy
burden-shift, precluding liability in such cases reflects a hidden policy
decision that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything because of
concerns with the possible adverse effect on the public employeremployee relationship and perhaps even on federalism.5" Whatever the
policy concerns, though, they do not belong in the Mt. Healthy causation-

57. Id. § 432(2) cmt. d.
58. This erroneous conflation is avoided for the most part by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.
59. Mt. Healthy, as interpreted by Lesage, is best understood as either a hidden
standing case or, more likely, a hidden damages case. See infra Part VIII.
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in-fact picture. To consider them in that connection distorts that
inquiry, an inquiry that should be relatively straightforward in nature.
Rather, these concerns should be addressed in the context of local
government liability and individual immunities.
VII.

SECTION 1983 POLICY

The crucial distinction between liability and damages in mixed-motive
First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause cases like Mt. Healthy
and Lesage, and in procedural due process cases like Carey, not only
finds support in common-law causation principles, but also promotes the
compensation and deterrent functions of section 1983. To the extent
that other interests, such as a concern with overdeterrence and
federalism, may be furthered by reading Mt. Healthy as going to liability
rather than damages, those interests should be forthrightly addressed
in the absolute and qualified immunity doctrines of section 1983 and not
embedded in the causation inquiry.
The compensation function"° of section 1983, given so much emphasis
in Carey, is surely promoted by a rule that requires a defendant who
surmounts the Mt. Healthy burden shift in a mixed-motive case to
compensate for the harm caused by his impermissible motive, even
though that compensation does not include job loss. As mentioned
earlier, the plaintiff may still have suffered emotional distress apart
from the job loss, and it is appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for
that harm. The deterrence function"1 of section 1983 is also thereby
promoted by this rule. We do not want government employers to act on
the basis of an impermissible First Amendment motive. The prospect of
liability will, and should, cause government employers to hesitate before

60. The basic purpose of section 1983 liability is "to compensate persons for injuries
caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights ....

Rights, constitutional and

otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect persons from injuries to
particular interests, and their contours are shaped by the interests they protect." Carey,
435 U.S. at 254.
61. "The very purpose of§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States
and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from
unconstitutional action under color of state law .... ." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
242 (1972). The deterrence function is also promoted by the availability of punitive
damages awards against individuals in certain circumstances. See Smith v. Wade, 461
U.S. 30, 51 (1983) (adopting a standard of reckless or callous disregard of, or indifference
to, the rights or safety of others). However, punitive damages are not available against
local governments. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
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acting on an impermissible motive. It will also reduce the likelihood of
using the permissible motive as a cover for the impermissible one.62
VIII. TEXAS V. LESAGE: A SECOND LOOK
If my position is normatively sound, how are Lesage and Mt. Healthy
explained? One possibility is that these are disguised standing cases:
Once a defendant carries the burden-shift, perhaps the plaintiff has
suffered no injury in fact and thus has no standing under Article III.63
But this is not persuasive because the plaintiff has in fact suffered an
injury: He or she has lost a job. Perhaps, then, a defendant who has
prevailed on the Mt. Healthyburden-shift has thereby demonstrated that
the plaintiff does not have Article III standing for a different reason:
The plaintiff cannot fairly trace his job loss to the defendant." But
this is similarly unconvincing because, even in such a case, the racial
motive was a substantial factor in causing the job loss, even if it was not
a but-for cause. It is also telling that reading Lesage and Mt. Healthy
as standing cases is inconsistent with the Court's descriptions of what
it is doing. The Court has never even hinted that Mt. Healthy's burden
shift raises standing issues.
A second possible explanation of Mt. Healthy and Lesage may be a bit
closer to the mark: They are disguised damages cases. The Court may
be saying that the plaintiffs in these cases are really making presumed
damages claims and that presumed damages are, according to Carey,
unavailable in section 1983 cases. That could explain the Court's
rejection of the Fifth Circuit's rationale that the plaintiff in Lesage

62. My position on Mt. Healthy is consistent with Ernest Weinrib's view that corrective
justice requires both causation and wrongdoing for noninstrumental compensatory
damages. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407
(1987). Building on that view, I have argued that wrongdoing is inherent in unconstitutional conduct (such as that in a Mt. Healthy mixed-motive case) and that compensatory
damages are normatively justified for all foreseeable harm resulting from unconstitutional
conduct. See Sheldon Nahmod, ConstitutionalDamagesand Corrective Justice: A Different
View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997 (1990) (disagreeing with John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for
ConstitutionalViolations: The Relation of Risk to Injury in ConstitutionalTorts, 75 VA. L.
REV. 1461 (1989)).
63. The Court has described actual or threatened injury in fact as an irreducible
minimum requirement for Article III standing. See Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
64. This aspect of Article III standing is occasionally referred to as the "fairly traceable"
requirement, and it is closely related to, but still analytically different from, the third
aspect of Article III standing, which is the requirement that the plaintiffs alleged injury
is "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
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suffered "'an implied injury.'"6 5 Or it might be saying that even if, in
the rare case, there might be some modest damages attributable to these
mixed-motive government decisions, these damages are de minimis and,
thus, scarce judicial resources should not be further expended once a
defendant has carried the burden shift. Moreover, to expend scarce
judicial resources in such modest damages cases would trivialize
constitutional rights and perhaps adversely affect important federalism
interests.
Significantly, these suggested damages explanations are not constitutionally based but are matters of section 1983 statutory interpretation.
Thus, they could theoretically be changed by Congress just as the Court's
interpretation of Title VII burden-shifting in Price Waterhouse was
changed by Congress.66 Nevertheless, because these explanations have
relatively little to do with causation-in-fact, the Court should have
confronted the damages issues directly and not buried them in the
causation-in-fact inquiry of Mt. Healthy.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Court will eventually have to distinguish Carey's holding that the
burden-shift goes to remedy and not to liability in procedural due
process cases from Lesage's contrary holding that the same burden shift
goes to liability and not to remedy in First Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause cases. Making this distinction will, in my view,
require the Court to address a difficult question involving the nature of
constitutional harm: When a defendant carries the burden-shift, why is
there a procedural due process violation but no First Amendment or
Equal Protection Clause violation? I reject this distinction and maintain
that there is constitutional harm in all three cases. My position is
consistent with the background of tort liability and promotes the
compensation and deterrent functions of section 1983.
Thus, Mt. Healthy's burden-shift rule should go to remedy and not to
liability in all section 1983 cases. Lesage is unsound, even though it is
now clearly the law that the burden-shift does indeed go to liability in
First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause cases under section 1983.

65.

120 S. Ct. at 468 (quoting Lesage, 158 F.3d at 222). This has some basis in the

following statement in the Fifth Circuit's opinion: "[Elven though the district court may
have correctly predicted that Lesage suffered no direct injury and therefore incurred no
compensatory damages, this scenario does not foreclose the availability of some other relief

to which he may be entitled." 158 F.3d at 222. It is not clear what "other relief" the Fifth
Circuit had in mind, but it might be presumed or nominal damages.
66. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075

(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1994)).
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That Lesage is a unanimous, per curiam decision signals that there was
little doubt among the Justices about the nature of Mt. Healthy, but that
does not make Lesage right.

*

*

*

